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Displacement and Resettlement:
Understanding the Role of Climate
Change in Contemporary Migration
Alison Heslin, Natalie Delia Deckard, Robert Oakes
and Arianna Montero-Colbert
Abstract Howdowe understand displacement and resettlement in the context of cli-
mate change? This chapter outlines challenges and debates in the literature connect-
ing climate change to the growing global flow of people. We begin with an outline of
the literature on environmental migration, specifically the definitions, measurements,
and forms of environmental migration. The discussion then moves to challenges in
the reception of migrants, treating the current scholarship on migrant resettlement.
We detail a selection of cases in which the environment plays a role in the displace-
ment of a population, including sea level rise in Pacific Island States, cyclonic storms
in Bangladesh, and desertification in West Africa, as well as the role of deforestation
in South America’s Southern Cone as a driver of both climate change and migration.
We outline examples of each, highlighting the complex set of losses and damages
incurred by populations in each case.
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10.1 Introduction
How do we understand displacement and resettlement in the era of climate change?
Scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers have been grapplingwithways to improve
life outcomes for large numbers of refugees and migrants. In particular, the 21st con-
ference of the Parties to the United Nations Climate Convention (UNFCCC) in Paris
created a taskforce to work out recommendations to “avert, minimize, and address
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displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change” (UNFCCC 2017). In
addressing the role of climate change in displacement, onemust identify theways that
factors pertaining to environmental change generally drive migration, as this rela-
tionship will become all the more important and complex with climate change (IOM
2017b). This chapter addresses the ways that the natural environment relates to the
global flow of people (Bettini and Andersson 2014; Bates 2002; Dun and Gemenne
2008). In addressing this relationship between the environment and displacement, we
first outline the primary debates within the environmental displacement and migra-
tion literature, as well as challenges in the reception of migrants in host communities
and nations. Using cases of climate-related displacement, we then highlight the com-
plexity of the social effects of environmental factors and the process of migration.
10.2 Defining and Measuring Migration
The complexity of environmental migration begins with the process of setting con-
crete, agreed upon definitions, however, defining and subsequently measuring the
process of environmental migration is not uniform throughout the literature (Dun
and Gemenne 2008).
10.2.1 Definitions
To understand the various means by which one can define environmental migration,
we may start by understanding the broader categories used to describe populations
outside their habitual place of residence, including migrant, refugee, asylum seeker,
and internally displaced person. In general, one may classify a person in these dif-
ferent categories based on the circumstances of their leaving their place of residence
and the destination of their movement (outlined in Fig. 10.1). According to the Inter-
national Organization forMigration, migrant is the most general term, encompassing
any person who “has moved across an international border or within a State away
from his/her habitual place of residence” (IOM 2018). By this definition, anyone
who falls within our matrix outlined in Fig. 10.1 is a migrant, but depending on
the circumstances of their movement, more precise labels and terminology can be
used to describe them. For instance, if one flees across an international border due
to a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion,” they can be further
classified as a refugee or asylum-seeker (UN 1951). In addition, one who is forced to
flee their home, but has not crossed an international border is considered an internally
displaced person (IDP) (IOM 2017c; UN 1998).
While the IOM definitions of refugees and IDPs are consistent with UN conven-
tions, the definition of migrant used by the IOM differs from that of the UN, which
uses a more narrow definition of migrant. According to the UN, a migrant is one
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Fig. 10.1 IOMmigration-related terminology by motivation and destination. Source IOM (2017c)
Fig. 10.2 UN migration-related terminology by motivation and destination. Sources UN (1951),
UN (1990), UN (1998)
residing outside the country of which he/she is a national, not including those cat-
egorised as refugees or asylum seekers (UN 1990). By the UN definition, migrant
would occupy only the bottom-left quadrant, shown in Fig. 10.2. This UN distinc-
tion is useful to differentiate the four categories into four separate, non-overlapping
labels—internal migrant, internally displaced person, migrant, and refugee/asylum
seeker—to be determined by two questions: Was the movement domestic or inter-
national? and was the movement voluntary or forced?
At its most simple, moving from migration broadly to environmental migration
specifically entails maintaining the same categories, but restricting to cases in which
the motivating factor for movement was environmentally-related, including those
caused by climate change. The IOM does just this, maintaining the encompassing
definition for migration, defining an environmental migrant as a person who
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for reasons of sudden or progressive changes in the environment that adversely affect their
lives or living conditions, are obliged to have to leave their habitual homes, or choose to do
so, either temporarily or permanently, and who move either within their territory or abroad
(IOM 2017c).
Alternatively, using the more restricted definition of migrant from the UN (vol-
untary, international), an environmental migrant would be one who voluntarily
resides outside his/her country for reasons of changes to the environment, sudden-
or gradually-onset. Internal environmental migrants voluntarily relocate domesti-
cally for reasons of environmental changes. An environmental refugee would be one
who, due to environmental factors, is forced to flee home and cross international
borders, whereas an environmental IDP is also forced to leave home but remains
within the state of which he/she is a national. While these terms may seem well
defined, the process of identifying populations that fall into each category is rife
with complications, leading to scientific and policy debates on the specific criteria
of the definitions. In determining the category into which a person falls, locating the
person as within or without their national borders is the most straightforward, while
determining whether or not that person moved voluntarily and whether or not that
movement was motivated by environmental factors, is cause for much debate in the
literature. The decision to leave a place of residence is multifaceted, comprised of
both push and pull factors (Bronen et al. 2009; Obokata et al. 2014; Renaud et al.
2007;Warner et al. 2010). In the case of slow onset land degradation, with decreasing
crop yields, for example, one could argue that a resident left willingly or was forced
to leave, as well as arguing that said resident left for new economic opportunities in
a nearby city or left for environmental reasons. Whether movement is forced or vol-
untary and whether motivated by environmental or economic reasons encompasses a
primary debate in the scientific literature on environmental migration (Bates 2002).
Additionally, because these definitions constitute legal classifications, identifying
which category a population falls into can carry with it particular sets of entitlements
or binding policy responses. For example, the UN High Commission on Refugees
provides aid and resources to refugees according to their definition of refugees (Gill
2010). Accordingly, environmentally displaced populations may not be eligible for
aid as refugees as they lack a “well founded fear of beingpersecuted” as outlined in the
UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Without the inclusion of natural
disasters or climate-related environmental degradation as forms of persecution, those
displaced from these causes do not constitute refugees per this definition (Bronen
et al. 2009; Warner et al. 2010). Despite this understanding from the UN, many
studies have used the term environmental refugees to describe those displaced by
environmental factors (Bates 2002; Myers 2002).
10.2.2 Measurement
A particular scientific implication of the definitional issues relating to environmental
migration is the capacity tomeasure and predict flows of environmental migrants (per
IOM definition). Data and empirical studies on environmental migration differ based
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Fig. 10.3 Migration totals, measured as total foreign-born population. Data SourceUnitedNations
Population Division (2017)
on the criteria used to identify population movements as voluntary versus forced and
environmentally or otherwise motivated.
Looking at international migration generally, data indicate increasing volumes of
migration, but differ depending on the means of measurement. The United Nations,
measuringmigration as the total foreign-born population throughout the world, iden-
tifies the number of foreign-born residents of countries to be over 250million in 2017,
with over 25 million of those categorised as refugees and asylum-seekers (United
Nations Population Division 2017). Figure 10.3 presents the United Nations data
measuring the number of people living outside their country of birth, showing sig-
nificant increases over the past 25 years.
While for foreign-born populations, there is readily available data, studies chal-
lenge this operationalisation of migration, as it fails to capture when people moved
and fromwhere. Abel and Sander (2014), for instance, estimate the volume of migra-
tion flows and direction since 1990, finding that while the stock of foreign-born
populations globally has increased, there has not been a drastic increase in the flow
of migrants in recent years, relative to the global population size or in absolute
quantities. These differences in measurement paint very different pictures regarding
contemporary global migration, with popular narratives often following UN data,
shown in Fig. 10.3, indicating massive increases in migrants.
The process of measurement and analysis is further complicated when attempting
to determine the cause of the movement.
Determining the proportion of international migrants who relocate due to envi-
ronmental changes faces the same challenges as estimating migrant flows, with the
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Fig. 10.4 New internal displacements per year from conflict and natural disasters. Data Source
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016
additional challenges of parsing environmental motivators from economic, social,
and political factors, which influence migration decisions in tandem (Black et al.
2011). Due to this complexity, as well as uncertainty in predicting future adaptive
capacity, predictions of future movements of people from climate change and envi-
ronmental causes vary from 25 million to 1 billion in 2050 (IOM 2017b).
In addition to international movement, populations move internally in massive
numbers in the face of environmental factors, including those affected by climate
change, such as natural disasters, environmental degradation, droughts, and floods.
The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimates the number of new internal
displacements per year at values far above those estimates of international migration
flows calculated by Abel and Sander (2014). As shown in Fig. 10.4, the number of
internal displacements in 2016was over 30million.Of those displaced in 2016, nearly
25 million were displaced by natural disasters, with large volumes of displacements
occurring in Asia, particularly China, India, and Pakistan, illustrated in Fig. 10.5
(IDMC 2017).
The current volume of displacements, internal and international, due to environ-
mental stressors is striking. With climate change increasing extreme weather events
as well as long-term climate variability, the IPCC finds evidence that current migra-
tion is partly driven by climate change and projects an increased displacement of
people over the 21st century, yet assigns low confidence to quantitative projections
(IPCC 2014).
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Fig. 10.5 Total number of new internally displaced by natural disasters 2008–2016. Data Source
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2016
10.3 Understanding Resettlement
Whether internal or international, the effects of displacement continue much beyond
the moment of departure, and as such we briefly address the literature on the process
of resettlement. This section provides an overview of the spaces and challenges faced
by the displaced in the process of resettling, including those for the voluntarymigrant
as well as the refugee.
The figure of the voluntary migrant is often cast as one motivated by rational
choices and systematic decisions.While conversations regarding refugees are framed
largely through questions of the right to asylum and the politics of conflict, themigra-
tion question is consumed by questions regarding their capacity to contribute to the
health and success of the local economy without detracting from local employment
or host community culture (Deckard and Heslin 2016). The framing of migration in
terms of economic contribution categorises the desirability and, subsequently, legal-
ity of migrants in a space (Golash-Boza 2015). Thus, anticipating the ways in which
environmental migrants are received by a host country is a matter of understanding
the economic desirability of that specific group in the country, which is subject to
change with variations in the economic situation of the receiving area or country.
In the United States, for example, immigrants of Hispanic and Latino orig-
in—often crossing the nation’s Southern border escaping a difficult-to-disentangle
combination of degraded natural resources, corruption, gang violence and economic
disarray (Bender and Arrocha 2017)—represent a significant source of migrant labor
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to the nation and are associated with cheap, unskilled labor in the national discourse
(Romero 2006). The inclusion of these migrants is metered by the degree to which
they are seen as contributing to the national economy (Deckard and Browne 2015).
This reality has become so anchored in the hegemonic common sense that a criminal-
ity has been constructed around migrant bodies, which are physically present while
economically surplus (Gunkel and González Wahl 2012). To the degree to which
migrants are seen as costing money in terms of social benefits or use of public goods,
they are viewed as members of an out-group. Conversely, to the extent that they are
perceived to work effectively and contribute to the general economic well-being,
they are seen as meritorious of inclusion in national communities (Armenta 2017;
Golash-Boza and Parker 2007).
The discourse around migrant labor is similar in other wealthy nations—most
notably the construction of the African inWestern Europe. Similar to the push factors
propelling Latino immigrants to the United States, the home country realities of the
French sans papiers vary in their combination of environmental degradation, conflict,
economic hardship and corruption. Also, similarly undocumentedmigrants to France
exist in the interstices of surplus labor and criminal (Schaap 2011). In sharp contrast
to the extensive positive attention given to methods of incorporation for refugees and
legal migrants—those who have been given permission to reside in the nation only
so long as they perform work explicitly required in order to meet national economic
goals—anyneed to integrate the economically surplus generated by global challenges
has, apparently, been addressed with their widespread criminalisation.
In addition to the flows of voluntary migrants internally and internationally, mass
events, such as natural disasters, can abruptly displace those living in a space, often
enmasse.When such large and sudden displacements occur, governments face logis-
tical and political challenges in managing the flow of people internally and across
international borders. In this process, the displaced can seek asylum, often settling
temporarily in refugee camps, beginning a prolonged, indefinite state of transience.
Understanding the role and structure of the refugee camp is an important compo-
nent of environmental migration, as refugee camps represent the political response
to mass displacement, as possible through large scale natural disasters. Through such
events, as well as large scale conflicts, displaced populations can flow into neigh-
bouring countries at rates, which exceed the economic, political, or social capacity or
willingness of the receiving country to accommodate. The structure of the camp itself
speaks to its roots in political expediency for the host country. Following the estab-
lished provisions in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and
1967 Protocol, to maintain credibility globally, countries face international pressure
to respond to mass displacement (Black 2001). The refugee camp thus arises out of
the juxtaposition of the international pressure to act charitably towards those in need
and a state’s inclination to keep “space and distance” from the refugees themselves
(Hyndman 2000).
In addressing the losses and damages of environmental displacement, one must
engage with the realities of the refugee camp. Rather than initiating a process of
assimilation, the camp inherently exists as a space of prolonged temporality, which
serves to exclude refugees’ participation in the economic and social activities of the
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host country, aswell as frompolitical representation and participation (Kibreab 2003;
Ramadan 2013). Further, refugee initiatives are often conducted with limited input
from the supposed beneficiaries of the aid (Silverman 2008; Hanafi and Long 2010),
thereby inhibiting the development of refugee communities into societal structures
of the host country and of the global economy at large (Hanafi and Long 2010). In
contrast to refugee camps, asylum policies aim to initiate the process of resettlement
for displaced persons. An asylum-seeker is one who has applied for refuge outside
their own country and is awaiting official refugee status in their new country of
residence. The refugee camp dweller is often not distinct from the asylum seeker,
as applications for asylum start once an individual has arrived in a refugee camp,
but also can begin following arrival to a host country legally by obtaining a work or
student visa.
Asylum-seekers, however, face many barriers in the process of resettlement. First,
because of bureaucratic process and the sheer number of applicants, central to the
experience of the twenty first century asylee is the experience of years of waiting
(Rotter 2016). The asylum-seeking process also requires costs associated with travel
and paperwork fees, often making resettlement inaccessible to many whose liveli-
hoods depend on it (Settlage 2009). Additionally, due to host citizens’ belief that
asylum-seekers take more than they give socially, destination countries may be less
than welcoming in their public policy affecting accepted asylees in an effort to deter
refugees from arriving. A study of the European Union indicates that countries com-
pete in a race to the bottom for provision of services through five areas of asylum
policy: ‘safe third country’ provisions, determination procedures, compulsory dis-
persal policy, welfare vouchers, and obstacles from employment (Thielemann 2004).
Critically, because the nation-state holds exclusive control over the bodies in its
territory, the right of asylum following from international law is generally understood
as a right for the state to grant or deny, rather than the right of an individual to
claim (Boed 1994). To be granted asylum as a refugee, according to the UN 1951
Refugee Convention, one must have a “well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion” (United National 1951). As outlined above, the construction of
climate-induced calamities as “natural” disasters, therefore, influences the perceived
legitimacy of resulting claims to refugeehood and asylum (Shacknove 1985). That
is, insofar as events such as hurricanes and droughts are interpreted as apolitical
tragedies, the presumed contract between citizen and state that grounds refugee policy
is never broken, thus lacking a sufficient claim of persecution.
10.4 Case Studies of Environmental Migration
The risks associated with climate change vary greatly between different geographic
locations and different social structures (IPCC 2014). Correspondingly, the mech-
anisms by which climate change can influence the flow of people also vary widely
from place to place, with corresponding sets of losses and damages faced by the
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affected populations at the time of departure as well as in the process of resettlement.
In this section, we detail a selection of cases in which the environment plays a role
in the displacement of a population, including sea-level rise, cyclonic storms, and
desertification, as well as the role of deforestation as a driver of both climate change
and migration. We outline examples of each, highlighting the complex set of losses
and damages incurred by populations in each case.
10.4.1 Sea-Level Rise in Pacific Island States
The dominantmedia representation of Pacific Small IslandDeveloping States (SIDS)
is of drowning islands, with rising sea levels compelling residents to move (Barnett
and Campbell 2010). However, this narrative is simplistic for two reasons. Firstly,
while sea-level rise does cause erosion andmore frequent, and intense flooding events
(Nurse et al. 2014), and floods can damage property, destroy crops, contaminatewater
supplies and spread disease through penetrating septic tanks (ADB 2014), it is not the
only climate hazard driving mobility. Changes in rainfall can combine with lack of
aquifers to produce a shortage of water for bathing, drinking, cooking and agriculture
(IPCC 2014) and the increase in CO2 in the atmosphere is contributing to ocean
acidification, impacting on fisheries (Manzello et al. 2017). Secondly, islanders are
not automatons which respond to climate change in fixed way by moving away from
the sea. Instead, they have a degree of individual and collective agency to respond, and
adapt to climate change (Gemenne 2011). It is also true that both climate change risk
perceptions and attitudes towards mobility are nuanced and differentiated within
Pacific SIDS. Recent qualitative research on Kiribati found three distinct shared
viewpoints on the themes. One group seemed to exempt itself from agency in the
matter, claiming that God would decide the fate of Kiribati. Another group believed
that climate change would likely result in some people leaving their islands, while a
final group stressed the existential threats of climate change to islands, populations
and culture (Oakes et al. 2016).
Nonetheless, when the impacts of climate change interact with the physical geog-
raphy and developmental status of the SIDS, human mobility can and does occur and
such movements have implications for Loss and Damage, with a general trend of
the more agential the movement, the less severe losses and damages. Displacement
can occur when an intensive natural hazard such as a storm or flood compels peo-
ple to leave their place of residence. Forcibly displaced persons have little control
over when, where and how they move and as a result are more likely to be subject
to losses and damages. In Kiribati, a survey revealed that almost every household
(94%) reported that they had been impacted by a natural hazard over the period
2005–2015, with sea-level rise affecting 80% of households (Oakes et al. 2016).
The same study found that one in seven of all movements from 2005 to 2015 were
attributed to environmental change (14%), and the vast majority of such movements
were internal (Fig. 10.6). This is despite the fact that international movement is often
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Fig. 10.6 The main reasons for moving in Kiribati 2005–2015. Source Oakes et al. (2016)
seen as desirable, suggesting a lack of choice in destination for people impacted by
a climate-impacted environment.
Losses and damages suffered in the context of such climate change related dis-
placement can be in the form of health, access to services and education, protection
and culture (Unicef UK 2017). In Pacific SIDS, king tides cause frequent floods and
are intensified by sea level rise and La Niña years (Lin et al. 2014). There can be very
short intervals between king tides (Lin et al. 2014) meaning that households have
little time to recover and can be locked into a vicious cycle of recovery. Vulnerable
groups are particularly at risk. Climate change related environmental degradation
has meant that children in Pacific SIDS have been forced to move to islands with
more resilient infrastructure for schooling. Often this involves staying with extended
families, which can place them at risk of all forms of abuse (PRRRT 2014).
Voluntary migration typically makes place as people seekmore secure livelihoods
less impacted by environmental hazards such as changes in rainfall, agricultural
yields and fisheries. In such instances, losses and damages can be less severe. The I-
Kiribati idea of “migration with dignity” has not been defined in a policy document,
but revolves around facilitating voluntary migration through improving education
and developing international networks (Voigt-Graf and Kagan 2017). In this man-
ner, it is hoped that people can migrate, generating remittances to enable adaptation
(IOM 2017a) improve their livelihoods (Gemenne and Blocher 2017) and in so doing
reduce future losses and damages inducing displacement. However, in both Kiribati
(Oakes et al. 2016) and Tuvalu (Milan et al. 2016) international migration is limited
by finances and permits. In the absence of options to move internationally, the major-
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ity of internal movements in these countries are to the capital cities, contributing to
overcrowding and threatening the attainment of the Sustainable Development Goals
and other development targets, especially those related to sanitation (Locke 2009;
ADB 2014; Oakes et al. 2016). Such urbanisation may therefore be termed maladap-
tive as it can increase both vulnerability and exposure to hazards (de Sherbinin 2013).
Planned relocation in SIDS takes place when the state or other authority organises
the re-settlement of communities out of harm’s way, often because of encroachment
by the ocean (Charan et al. 2017). Stratford et al. (2013) explain how the Tuvaluan
word “Fenua” is useful for describing the concept of place for communities in Pacific
SIDS:
A set of customary practices and territorial markers, fenua captures the ways in which Pacific
community identity is usually linked to part of an island—such as a valley or bay—and
explains the biographical location of identity in place. Fenua is a term that indistinguishably
bundles together community/people/places. (Stratford et al. 2013:69)
Fenua therefore explains how culture and life itself is often inextricable from
the land, island or part of the island of a people and goes some way to explain-
ing the complexity inherent in relocations. Throughout the 20th century various
relocations took place within the Pacific region, many of which were unsuccess-
ful for not considering livelihoods or cultural differences (Connell 2012) and even
possibly contributing to deaths as people were exposed to new environmental risks
(Donner 2015). Unsurprisingly, proposed relocations have been rejected by the mov-
ing community (Tabucanon and Opeskin 2011). Some people are reticent to move as
potential migrants feel that they will lose a link to their past and their very cultural
identity (Mortreaux and Barnettt 2009). As a result, moving from home can bring
feelings of grief and anxiety (Doherty and Clayton 2011) and people may stay in
objectively risky areas (Oakes et al. 2016). Some recent relocations have been more
successful where processes are participatory and consideration is given to culture
and livelihoods (Tabucanon 2012). Guidelines of good practice have been produced
to improve the experiences of those who relocate which may contribute to better
results for both relocating and host communities (Brookings and UNHCR 2015),
thereby minimising losses and damages.
10.4.2 Cyclonic Storms
Cyclonic storms affect tropical and subtropical regions, in theAtlantic,Caribbean and
North-East Pacific as hurricanes and in North-West Pacific as typhoons and the South
Pacific and Indian Ocean as cyclones. It is impossible to link a particular storm to
climate change, and globallywith increased temperatures, less storms could form due
to changes in wind shear (Vecchi and Soden 2007). Nonetheless climate change will
likely result in higher risk from cyclones through increased average sea temperatures
causing more intense and wetter storms and sea-level rise magnifying the impact of
storm surges—the main killer in cyclones (IPCC 2012). These climatic changes are
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occurring at the same time as economic and demographic changes, which result in
larger, more vulnerable populations living in more exposed areas (Hugo 2011). As
a result, globally millions of people are affected each year, with 12.9 million people
displaced by storms in 2016 (IDMC 2017). Whether human mobility related to a
cyclone is before or after the event, the losses and damages can be extensive.
Poorer countries are typically more exposed to cyclonic storms due to their loca-
tions in tropical regions and more vulnerable to their impacts due to poverty, liveli-
hoods dependent on natural resources and low levels of education and healthcare
(Blaikie et al. 2014). Bangladesh is low-lying and deltaic meaning that each year
millions of vulnerable people are living in areas exposed to cyclones and floods. As
such, according to the World Risk Index, in 2016 Bangladesh was the 5th most at
risk country in the world (Garschagen et al. 2016). Although Bangladesh has early
warning systems, these do not always grant sufficient time for people to leave in a
manner to minimise losses and damages. Moreover, some people may stay to protect
their livelihoods (Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016). There are also cultural barriers which
may contribute to non-evacuation. Some people may be fatalistic about cyclones
and conceptualise evacuation as against Allah’s will (Haque 1995). Unaccompanied
women might not go to the cyclone shelter, as it can be culturally taboo (Paul 2014).
In cyclone shelters, and on the journey to them, women and children are at risk of
disease through insanitary conditions and may even cause themselves harm through
reluctance to go to the toilet in public (Unicef UK 2017).
After repeated displacements Bangladeshis maymove either seasonally or perma-
nently (Unicef UK2017), makingDhaka one of fastest growing city in theworldwith
residents subject to losses and damages. Almost half the population of Dhaka lives in
slums where approximately a third have no access to sanitation (World Bank 2015)
and are exposed to communicable disease (Banu et al. 2013). Children in Dhaka
presented a significantly higher number of disability-adjusted life years (DALYs)
than children who had not been displaced (Molla et al. 2014). Seasonal or permanent
migration to a city can bring new or increased risks related to working conditions
(Ayeb-Karlsson et al. 2016) and children can miss out on school if they are obliged
to find work (Unicef UK 2017).
Rich countries are not immune to losses and damages associated with mobility
related to cyclonic storms. The USA is frequently impacted by hurricanes, with
875,000 people displaced by Hurricane Matthew in 2016 (IDMC 2017). By mid-
October, the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season had produced 15 storms, 10 hurricanes
and5major hurricanes,while themonth of September 2017was the singlemost active
month for Atlantic storms on record (The Weather Channel 2017). Projections for
the North Atlantic show a 45% increase in the number of major hurricanes (category
3 or above) in the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986-2005 and an 11% increase in
related rainfall (Knutson et al. 2010). Hurricanes Irene and Sandy in 2011 and 2012
respectivelymay provide evidence of a shift in the hurricane belt (IPCC 2012), which
could have implications for a population lacking the experience and infrastructure
to cope with hurricanes (Cutter et al. 2007).
The poorest and ethnic minority communities are typically those which suffer
the most severe losses and damages through hurricane displacement. The natural
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and man-made processes which combined for Hurricane Katrina, meant that some
termed the disaster “death by political economy” for the African America residents
of Louisiana (Price 2008). Children are also more likely to be affected by hurricane
displacement. Children displaced by Hurricane Katrina were five times more likely
to suffer from emotional distress (Abramson et al. 2010) and those in a state of
prolonged displacement and unable to return to the city were more likely to suffer
from post-traumatic stress disorder and depression than those who moved within the
city (Hansel et al. 2013). Over a third of children displaced by Hurricane Katrina
were a year or more behind in school (Abramson et al. 2010). There were also
ramifications on school behaviour, attendance, suspension, expulsion and drop-out
rates (Pane et al. 2006; Ward et al. 2008).
In the USA, typically 20–30% of the affected populations fail to respond to evac-
uation orders and remain in the disaster area during storms (Redlener 2006). This
can be attributed to differentiated risk perception, others fail to evacuate prior to the
landfall of the hurricane to avoid perceived losses and damages that leaving entails.
Reasons for not evacuating include the discomfort for elderly or infirm (VanWilligen
et al. 2002) protecting one’s home from looters (Riad et al. 1999), previous problems
with evacuation traffic (Morss and Hayden 2010), anxiety about being arrested for
undocumented workers (Tiefenbacher and Wilson 2012), reluctance to leave pets
(Heath et al. 2001) and the need to be able to clean up after the storm as soon as
possible (Dash and Morrow 2000).
10.4.3 The Desertification of West Africa and the Ascendance
of Boko Haram
Natural disasters—however unnatural—are not the only movers of people across
nations and regions. The changing terrain that accompanies widespread climate
change also shifts geo-political realities, and with them the landscape of conflict.
Here, we consider the ways in which slowly-worsening environmental conditions
change people’s locations and lives, specifically desertification and deforestation.
Desertification hasmade previously fertile agricultural land functionally uninhab-
itable in regions throughout the world (Bettini and Andersson 2014; Owusu 2013;
Vieira et al. 2015). Existing research has linked this phenomenon to man-made cli-
mate change for nearly 25 years (Hulme andKelly 1993; Calabrò andMagazù 2016).
In the case of the Sahara, it has made already tenuous post-colonial regimes even
more vulnerable, as fragile states struggle to maintain basic services while grappling
with the arrival of citizens and migrants in transit (Ferris 2012). Traditional ways of
life have been rendered obsolete as villages are overtaken by the sand of the Sahel
and, in the case of Nigeria, the trend has worked to further impoverish the Northern
provinces of the nation (Mantzikos 2010). In the Maiduguri province of Northern
Nigeria, school teachers were unable to cultivate land or fish during school breaks.
This newly found desperation contributed to their organising of students into the rad-
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ical Islamist organisation referred to as Boko Haram (Deckard et al. 2015; Walker
2012).
With the rise of Boko Haram has come relentless attacks against Nigerian secu-
lar institutions—especially in the North (Mohammed 2014; Agbiboa 2013). Actual
deaths since 2009 number approximately 100,000 (Tukur 2017), and churches
(Michael Kpughe 2017), schools (Aghedo and Osumah 2012) and public spaces
(Maiangwa et al. 2012) have all been targeted. The relentless violence has been
met by similar attacks by the Nigerian military—resulting in thousands more civil-
ian casualties. As of 2017, Boko Haram has displaced an estimated two million
Northern Nigerians, sending families fleeing throughout Nigeria and into the neigh-
bouring countries of Chad and Cameroon (Tukur 2017). Certainly, the actions of
individual Boko Haram and Nigeria military members are to blame for this displace-
ment, but also worth understanding is the way in which slow-moving environmental
degradation has contributed to the conflict between the two parties, and subsequent
displacement of millions. In the stories of the displaced, there is much discussion of
deteriorating conditions and a wish to return to not only the geographical home—but
the traditional one (Jacob et al. 2016). Given the realities of climate change, however,
this traditional home may be considered a fictive one, as livelihoods are no longer
sustainable.
10.4.4 The Deforestation of the Southern Cone
and the Urbanisation of the Campesino
In the consideration of climate change as a driver of migration, we can see the
ways in which natural disasters and sea-level rise displace populations, as well as
consequences of damages to traditional livelihoods in the case of Nigeria. In addi-
tion to examples of displacement and conflict relating to climate change, there are
development-related phenomena that are causal agents of climate change, while also
working to drive migration. In such cases, as people are systematically moved, the
land is cleared for further development, spurring both climate change at the local and
global level and a continued feedback loop of migration and further development.
Here, we treat the specific issue of monoculture-propelled deforestation in South
America’s Southern Cone—a documented cause of the type of slow-moving climate
change that pushes intergenerational movement (Bonan 2008).
Soybean monoculture increasingly defines the landscape of the Southern Cone
and the lives of the people in it (Oliveira and Hecht 2016). The link between soy,
deforestation and changing climate is well-documented in both the scholarly litera-
ture and the collective memory of communities torn apart by soy (Fehlenberg, et al.
2017; Hetherington 2011). As deforestation continues apace, realities for peasant
campesinos in Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil are being upended (Fair 2011).
In response to their wholesale dispossession at the hands of agribusiness and with
the collusion of the various national governments, campesinos have been migrat-
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ing—both to urban areas within their own countries and abroad Parrado and Cerrutti
(2003). The Paraguayan case is particularly instructive, given the nation’s status as
a paradigm of neoliberal governance in its post-dictatorship (Nickson and Lambert
2002; Ezquerro-Cañete 2016). As the state’s “hands off” approach to both export-
oriented agribusiness and migration has allowed the results of deforestation to affect
the nation’s social dynamics in a way that is largely uninfluenced by regulation or
legislation.
Paraguayan campesinos overwhelmingly relocate to informal settlements in the
nation’s three largest urban centres (Hetherington 2011; Reed 2015). These slum
areas, known as bañados, are completely without the presence of the state—with
dwellings having no reliable access to power, no mailing addresses and complying
with no legal building codes (Reed 2015; Cunningham et al. 2012). Despite the
presence of privately built streets of various quality, the communities do not appear on
maps.As indicated by the nomenclature,bañados are located infloodplains—leaving
the residents to evacuate to public parks and street corners on higher ground in times
of flood (Hetherington 2011). Although bañados have no permanent infrastructure,
residences are inhabited multi-generationally, with adults in 2017 living with their
children in themost desirably located bañado homes constructed by the grandparents
as early as the 1930s. Although the families may be understood as displaced, their
current homes are permanently in temporary spaces, and their government has no
demonstrated intention of changing this reality.
10.5 Conclusions
As climate change continues to put at risk the livelihoods and personal security of
populations throughout the world, the movement of people internally and across
international borders will continue. Due to the numerous consequences of climate
change and the ways climate change interacts with other environmental stressors
and existing social structures, the pathways by which changes in climate displace
populations differ greatly between places, overlapping in ways specific to a par-
ticular locale. In this chapter, we outlined examples of these overlapping climate
risks in locations including Pacific Small Island Developing States, West Africa and
the Southern Cone, highlighting the complex interactions between the environment,
natural resources, extreme weather, and society. With the push of populations away
from their homes through sea-level rise, cyclones, desertification, or other environ-
mental change, we draw attention to the ways in which displaced populations are
received and the challenges they face in resettlement. This piece is critical for under-
standing the losses and damages associated with dislocation, as risks to displaced
populations do not end once they have left their homeland. Studies of climate-related
displacement must address where people move to and how the political economy of
the sending and receiving nations affects the capacity of migrants to resettle and
succeed in their new country. Additionally, in considering future climate change and
its effects on populations, we must also acknowledge that in the face of losses and
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damages to livelihoods and safety, not all are able to relocate. Studies of climate-
induced migration will also need to take into account those left behind and whether
they have sufficient resources to address future damages from climate change. In this
way, future studies of climate and displacement must include both the process of
leaving and resettling, as covered here, as well as an investigation into the standard
of living for those who remained.
References
AbelGJ, SanderN (2014)Quantifying global internationalmigrationflows. Science 343:1520–1522
Abramson DM, Park YS, Stehling-Ariza T Redlener I (2010) Children as bellwethers of recovery:
dysfunctional systems and the effects of parents, households, and neighborhoods on serious emo-
tional disturbance in children after Hurricane Katrina. Disaster Med Public Health Preparedness
4(Suppl 1):S17–27
AgbiboaD (2013)Theongoing campaignof terror inNigeria:BokoHaramversus the state. Stability:
Int J Security Develop 2(3):1–18
Aghedo I, Osumah O (2012) The Boko Haram uprising: how should nigeria respond? Third World
Q 33(5):853–869
ArmentaA (2017)Racializing crimmigration: structural racism, colorblindness, and the institutional
production of immigrant criminality. Sociol Race Ethnic 3(1):82–95
Asian Development Bank (ADB) (2014) Economic costs of inadequate water and sanitation: South
Tarawa. Kiribati, Asian Development Bank
Ayeb-Karlsson S, Geest K, Ahmed I, Huq S, Warner K (2016) A people-centred perspective
on climate change, environmental stress, and livelihood resilience in Bangladesh. Sustain Sci
11(4):679–694
Banu S, Rahman MT, Uddin MKM, Khatun R, Ahmed T, Rahman MM, Husain MA, van Leth
F (2013) Epidemiology of tuberculosis in an urban slum of Dhaka City, Bangladesh. PloS one
8(10):e77721. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0077721
Barnett J, Campbell J (2010) Climate change and small island states: power, knowledge, and the
South Pacific. Earthscan, London
Bates DC (2002) Environmental refugees? Classifying human migrations caused by environmental
change. Popul Environ 23(5):465–477
Bender SW, Arrocha WF (2017) Introduction. In: Bender SW, Arrocha WF (eds) Compassionate
migration and regional policy in the Americas. Palgrave Macmillan UK, London, pp 1–15
Bettini G, Andersson E (2014) Sand waves and human tides: exploring environmental myths on
desertification and climate-induced migration. J Environ Develop 23(1):160–185
Black R (2001) Fifty years of refugee studies: from theory to policy. Int Migr Rev 35(1):57–78
BlackR,Bennett SRG,ThomasSM,Beddington JR (2011)Climate change:migration as adaptation.
Nature 478:447–449. https://doi.org/10.1038/478477a
Blaikie P, Cannon T, Davis I, Wisner B (2014) At risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and
disasters. Routledge, Oxon
Boed R (1994) The state of the right of asylum in international law. Duke J Compar Int Law
5(1):1–34
Bonan GB (2008) Forests and climate change: forcings, feedbacks, and the climate benefits of
forests. Science 320(5882):1444–1449
Bronen R, Chandrasekhar D, Conde D, Kavanova K, Caro Morinière L, Schmidt K, Witter R
(2009) Stay in place or migrate: a research perspective on understanding adaptation to a changing
environment. In: Oliver-Smith A, Shen X (eds) Linking environmental change, migration and
254 A. Heslin et al.
social vulnerability, studies of the university: research. Edication—Publication Series of the
UNU-ERS, Counsel, pp 12–21
Brookings & UNHCR (2015) Guidance on Planned Relocation. http://www.unhcr.org/uk/protecti
on/environment/562f798d9/planned-relocation-guidance-october-2015.html
Calabrò E, Magazù S (2016) Correlation between increases of the annual global solar radiation and
the ground albedo solar radiation due to desertification—a possible factor contributing to climatic
change. Climate 4(4):64
Charan D, Kaur M, Singh P (2017) Customary land and climate change induced relocation—a
case study of Vunidogoloa Village, Vanua Levu, Fiji. In Climate Change Adaptation in Pacific
Countries. Springer International Publishing, pp 19–33
Connell J (2012) Population resettlement in the Pacific: lessons from a hazardous history? Aust
Geogr 43(2):127–142
Cunningham R, Simpson C, Keifer M (2012) Hazards faced by informal recyclers in the squatter
communities of Asunción, Paraguay. Int J Occup Environ Health 18(3):181–187
Cutter SL, Johnson LA, Finch C, Berry M (2007) The U.S. Hurricane coasts: increasingly vulner-
able? Environ: Sci Policy Sustain Develop 49(7):8–21
Dash N, Morrow B (2000) Return delays and evacuation order compliance: the case of Hurricane
Georges and the Florida Keys. Global Environ Change Part B: Environ Hazards 2(3):119–128
de Sherbinin A (2013) Climate change hotspots mapping: what have we learned? Clim Change
123(1):23–37
Deckard ND, Barkindo A, Jacobson D (2015) Religiosity and Rebellion in Nigeria: considering
Boko Haram in the radical tradition. Stud Conflict Terrorism 37(7):510–528
DeckardND,Browne I (2015)Constructing citizenship: framing unauthorized immigrants inmarket
terms. Citizsh Stud 19(6–7):664–681
Deckard N, Heslin A (2016) After postnational citizenship: constructing the boundaries of inclusion
in neoliberal contexts. Sociol Compass 10(4):294–305
Doherty TJ, Clayton S (2011) The psychological impacts of global climate change. Am Psychol
66(4):265
Donner SD (2015)The legacy ofmigration in response to climate stress: learning from theGilbertese
resettlement in the Solomon Islands. Nat Res Forum 39(3–4):191–201
DunO, Gemenne F (2008) Defining environmental migration. ForcedMigr Rev 31(October):10–11
Ezquerro-Cañete A (2016) Poisoned, dispossessed and excluded: a critique of the neoliberal soy
regime in Paraguay. J Agrarian Change 16(4):702–710
Fair EM (2011) The peasantary with modern capitalism: power, position, and class. The Global
Labour University, London
Fehlenberg V, Baumann M, Ignacio N, Piquer-Rodrigueza M, Gavier-Pizarrod G, Kuemmerle T
(2017) The role of soybean production as an underlying driver of deforestation in the South
American Chaco. Glob Environ Change 45:24–34
Ferris E (2012) Internal displacement inAfrica: an overview of trends and opportunities. Brookings-
LSE Project on Internal Displacement, New York, pp 1–12
Garschagen M, Hagenlocher M, Comes M, Dubbert M, Sabelfeld R, Lee YJ, Grunewald L,
Lanzendörfer M, Mucke P, Neuschäfer O, Pott S (2016) World Risk Report 2016
Gemenne F (2011) Why the numbers don’t add up: a review of estimates and predictions of people
displaced by environmental changes. Glob Environ Change 21(S1):41–S49
Gemenne F, Blocher J (2017) How can migration serve adaptation to climate change? Challenges
to fleshing out a policy ideal. Geogr Journal 183(4):336–347
Gill N (2010) ‘environmental refugees’: Key debates and the contributions of geographers. Geog-
raphy Compass 4:861–871
Golash-Boza T (2015) Deported: immigrant policing. NYU Press, Disposable Labor and Global
Capitalism
Golash-Boza T, Parker D (2007) Human Rights in a globalizing world: who pays the human cost
of migration? J Latino/Latin American Stud 2(4):34–46
10 Displacement and Resettlement: Understanding … 255
Gunkel SE, González Wahl A-M (2012) Unauthorized migrants and the (Il)Logic of “Crime Con-
trol”: a human rights perspective on us federal and local state immigration policies. Sociol Com-
pass 6(1):26–45
Hanafi S, LongT (2010)Governance, governmentalities, and the state of exception in the Palestinian
refugee camps of Lebanon. J Refugee Stud 23(2):135–159
Hansel TC, Osofsky JD, Osofsky HJ, Friedrich P (2013) The effect of long-term relocation on child
and adolescent survivors of Hurricane Katrina. J Trauma Stress 26(5):613–620
Haque CE (1995) Climatic hazards warning process in Bangladesh: experience of, and lessons
from, the 1991 April cyclone. Environ Manage 19(5):719–734
Heath SE, Kass PH, Beck AM, Glickman LT (2001) Human and pet-related risk factors for house-
hold evacuation failure during a natural disaster. Am J Epidemiol 153(7):659–665
Hetherington K (2011) Guerrilla auditors: the politics of transparency in neoliberal Paraguay. Duke
University Press, Durham, NC
HulmeM, KellyM (1993) Exploring the links between desertification and climate change. Environ:
Sci Policy Sustain Develop 35(6):4–45
Hugo G (2011) Future demographic change and its interactions with migration and climate change.
Glob Environ Change 21(S1):S21–S33
Hyndman J (2000)Managingdisplacement: refugees and the politics of humanitarianism.University
of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN
IDMC (2016) Global Internal Displacement Database. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IDMC (2017) Global Report on Internal Displacement. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
IPCC (2012) Managing the risks of extreme events and disasters to advance climate change adap-
tation: special report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. Cambridge University
Press, Cambridge and New York
IPCC (2014) Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability—Part A: global and
sectoral aspects. In: Field CB and others (eds) Contribution of working group II to the fifth
assessment report of the intergovernmental panel on climate change. CambridgeUniversity Press,
Cambridge and New York
IOM (2017a) Making mobility work for adaptation to environmental changes: results from the
MECLEP global research. International Organization for Migration, Geneva
IOM (2017b)Migration, climate change and the environment: a complex nexus. International Orga-
nization for Migration, Geneva
IOM (2017c) Migration, climate change and the environment: definitional issues. International
Organization for Migration, Geneva
IOM (2018) Key migration terms. International Organization for Migration, Geneva
Jacob JU-U, Abia-Bassey M, Nkanga E, Aliyu A (2016) Narratives of displacement: conversations
with boko haram displaced persons in Northeast Nigeria. Contemporary French and Francophone
Studies 20(2):176–190
Kibreab G (2003) Displacement, host governments’ policies, and constraints on the construction of
sustainable livelihoods. Int Soc Sci J 55(175):57–67
Knutson TR, McBride JL, Chan J, Emanuel K, Holland G, Landsea C, Held I, Kossin JP, Srivastava
AK, Sugi M (2010) Tropical cyclones and climate change. Nat Geosci 3:157–163
Lin CC, Ho CR, Cheng YH (2014) Interpreting and analyzing King Tide in Tuvalu. Nat Hazards
Earth Sys Sci 14(2):209–217
Locke JT (2009) Climate change-induced migration in the Pacific region: sudden crisis and long-
term developments. Geogr J 175(3):171–180
Maiangwa B, Uzodike UO, Whetho A, Onapajo H (2012) “Baptism by Fire”: Boko Haram and the
Reign of Terror in Nigeria. Africa Today 59(2):40–57
Mantzikos I (2010) The absence of the state in Northern Nigeria: the case of Boko Haram. Afr
Renaissance 7(1):57–62
Manzello DP, Eakin CM, Glynn PW (2017) Effects of global warming and ocean acidification
on carbonate budgets of eastern pacific coral reefs. In: Glynn PW, Manzello DP, Enouchs IC
256 A. Heslin et al.
(eds) Coral reefs of the eastern tropical Pacific: persistence and loss in a dynamic environment.
Springer, Netherlands, pp 517–533
Michael Kpughe L (2017) Christian churches and the Boko Haram insurgency in cameroon: dilem-
mas and responses. Religions 8(8):143
MilanA,OakesR,Campbell J (2016) Tuvalu: climate change andmigration—relationships between
household vulnerability, humanmobility and climate changeReport No.18. Bonn:UnitedNations
University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). http://collections.unu.e
du/view/UNU:5856
Mohammed K (2014) The message and methods of Boko Haram. In: de Montclos MP (ed) Boko
Haram: Islamism, politics, security and the State in Nigeria. African Studies Centre - Institut
Français de Recherche en Afrique (IFRA), Leiden, Netherlands, pp 9–32
Molla NA, Mollah KA, Fungladda W, Ramasoota P (2014) Multidisciplinary household environ-
mental factors: influence on DALYs lost in climate refugees community. Environ Develop 9:1–11
Morss RE, Hayden MH (2010) Storm Surge and ‘Certain Death’: interviews with texas coastal
residents following Hurricane Ike. Weather Clim Soc 2:174–189
Mortreux C, Barnett J (2009) Climate change, migration and adaptation in Funafuti, Tuvalu. Global
Environ Change 19(1):105–112
Myers N (2002) Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century. Phil Trans R
Soc Lond B 357:609–613
Nickson A, Lambert P (2002) State reform and the ‘Privatized State’ in Paraguay. Public Admin
Develop 22(2):163–174
Nurse LA, McLean RF, Agard J, Briguglio LP, Duvat-Magnan V, Pelesikoti N, Tompkins E, Webb
A (2014) Small islands. In: Climate change 2014: impacts, adaptation, and vulnerability. Part
B: regional aspects. Contribution of working group II to the fifth assessment report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change. Barros VR, Field CB, Dokken DJ, Mastrandrea MD,
Mach KJ, Bilir TE, Chatterjee M, Ebi KL, Estrada YO, Genova RC, Girma B, Kissel ES, Levy
AN, MacCracken S, Mastrandrea PR, White LL (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,
United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, pp. 1613–1654
Oakes R, Milan A, Campbell J (2016) Kiribati: climate change and migration—relationships
between household vulnerability, human mobility and climate change. Report No. 20. Bonn:
United Nations University Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS). http://c
ollections.unu.edu/view/UNU:5903
Obokata R, Veronis L, McLeman R (2014) Empirical research on international environmental
migration: a systematic review. Popul Environ 36:111–135
Oliveira G, Hecht S (2016) Sacred Groves, Sacrifice Zones and soy production: globalization,
intensification and neo-nature in South America. J Peasant Stud 46(2):251–285
OwusuAB (2013)Measuring desertification in continuum: normalized difference vegetation index-
based study in the upper east region, Ghana. Civil Environ Res 3(12):157–170
Pacific Regional Rights Resource Team (PRRRT) (2004) Commercial sexual exploitation of chil-
dren and child sexual abuse in the Republic of Kiribati: a situation analysis. Tarawa, Kiribati:
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF)
Pane JF, McCaffrey DF, Tharp-Taylor S, Asmus GJ, Stokes BR (2006) Student displacement in
Louisiana after the hurricanes of 2005: experiences of public schools and their students. RAND
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA
Parrado EA, Cerrutti M (2003) Labor migration between developing countries: the case of Paraguay
and Argentina. Int Migrat Rev 37(1):101–132
Paul SK (2014) Determinants of evacuation response to cyclone warning in coastal areas of
Bangladesh: a comparative study. Oriental Geographer 55(1–2):57–84
Price GN (2008) Hurricane Katrina: was there a political economy of death? Rev Black Political
Econ 35(4):163–180
Ramadan A (2013) Spatialising the refugee camp. Trans Inst Br Geogr 38(1):65–77
Redlener IM (2006) Americans at Risk: why we are not prepared for Megadisasters and what we
can do now. Knopf, New York, NY
10 Displacement and Resettlement: Understanding … 257
Reed RK (2015) Environmental destruction, guaraní refugees, and indigenous identity in Urban
Paraguay. In: Wood DC (ed) Climate change, culture, and economics: anthropological investiga-
tions. Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, UK, pp 263–292
Renaud F, Bogardi J, Dun O, Warner K (2007) Control, adapt or flee how to face environmental
migration? Interdisciplinary Security Connections Publication Series of UNU-EHS 5
Riad JK,Norris FH,RubackRB (1999) Predicting evacuation in twomajor disasters: risk perception,
social influence, and access to resources. J Appl Soc Psychol 29(5):918–934
RomeroM (2006) Racial profiling and immigration law enforcement: rounding up of usual suspects
in the Latino community. Critical Sociol 32(2–3):447–473
Rotter R (2016) Waiting in the Asylum determination process: just an empty interlude? Time Soc
25(1):80–101
Schaap A (2011) Enacting the right to have rights: Jacques Ranciére’s critique of Hannah Arendt.
Eur J Polit Theor 10(1):22–45
Settlage RD (2009) Affirmatively denied: the detrimental effects of a reduced grant rate for affir-
mative asylum seekers. Boston Univ Int Law J 27(61):61–113
Shacknove AE (1985) Who is a refugee? Ethics 95(2):274–284
Silverman SJ (2008) Redrawing the lines of control: political interventions by refugees and the
sovereign state system. Dead/Lines: Contemporary Issues in Legal and Politics Theory 1–27
Stratford E, Farbotko C, Lazrus H (2013) Tuvalu, sovereignty and climate change: considering
Fenua, the archipelago and emigration. Island Stud J 8(1):67–83
Tabucanon G (2012) The Banaban resettlement: implications for Pacific environmental migration.
Pacific Stud 35(3):343–370
Tabucanon G, Opeskin B (2011) The resettlement of Nauruans in Australia: an early case of failed
environmental migration. J Pacific History 46(3):337–356
Thielemann ER (2004) Why Asylum policy harmonisation undermines refugee Burden-sharing.
Eur J Migr Law 6:47–65
The Weather Channel (2017) September 2017 Was the Most Active Month on Record for Atlantic
Hurricanes. https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/september-2017-most-active-month-on-
record for-atlantic-hurricanes
Tiefenbacher JP, Wilson SN (2012) The barriers impeding precautionary behaviours by undocu-
mented immigrants in emergencies: the hurricane Ike experience inHouston,Texas,USA.Environ
Hazards 11(3):194–212
Tukur S (2017) 100,000 Killed, two million displaced by Boko Haram insurgency, Borno Governor
Says. Premium Times, 13 February
Unicef UK (2017) No place to call home: protecting children’s rights when the changing climate
forces them to flee. London: Unicef. https://downloads.unicef.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/
04/No-Place-To-Call-Home.pdf?_ga=2.73316244.623674493.1494945170-1964912592.14836
24860
United Nations (UN) (1951) 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Geneva
United Nations (UN) (1990) International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of AllMigrant
Workers and Members of their Families
United Nations (UN) (1998) OCHA Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement. New York and
Geneva
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2017) Task force on dis-
placement at a glance. The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, United
Nations
United Nations Population Division (2017) Trends in International migrant stock: The
2017 revision. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (United Nations database,
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2017)
Van Willigen M, Edwards M, Edwards B, Hesse S (2002) Riding out the storm: experiences of
the physically disabled during Hurricanes Bonnie, Dennis, and Floyd. Natural Hazards Review
3(3):98–106
258 A. Heslin et al.
Vecchi GA, Soden BJ (2007) Global warming and the weakening of the tropical circulation. J Clim
20(17):4316–4340
Vieira RMSP, Tomasella J, Alvalá RCS, Sestini MF, Affonso AG, Rodriguez DA, Barbosa AA,
CunhaAPMA,VallesGF, Crepani E, deOliveira SBP, de SouzaMSB,Calil PM, deCarvalhoMA,
ValerianoDM,Campello FCB, SantanaMO(2015) Identifying areas susceptible to desertification
in the Brazilian Northeast. Solid Earth 6(1):347–360
Voigt-Graf C, Kagan S (2017) Migration and labour mobility from Kiribati. development policy
centre discussion Paper No. 56. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2937416 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2937416
Walker A (2012) What is Boko Haram?. US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC
Ward ME, Shelley K, Kaase K, Pane JF (2008) Hurricane Katrina: A longitudinal study of the
achievement and behavior of displaced students. J Educ Stud Placed at Risk 13(2–3):297–317
Warner K, Hamza M, Oliver-Smith A, Renaud F, Julca A (2010) Climate change, environmental
degradation and migration. Nat Hazards 55:689–715
World Bank (2015) South Asia Population, Urban Growth: A Challenge and an Opportunity. Avail-
able at: http://go.worldbank.org/K67SR8GMQ0
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
